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Using the established definition of situated cognition in organizations as “the interaction of cognitive schemas andorganizational context” (Lant 2002), we examine empirical case studies from the last 15 years to illustrate what situated
cognitions in organizations might actually look like. Grounded in this research, we develop a framework that identifies
how some specific forms of cognitive schemas (i.e., rule schemas, event schemas, person schemas) and specific contexts
(e.g., physical contexts, institutional contexts) interact during sensemaking processes to give rise to momentary perceptions
that we call situated cognitions. We present evidence that common patterns of interaction between schemas and context
may occur during sensemaking in organizations. In terms of theoretical implications, our framework focuses attention on
the specific interactions between context and cognition (rather than on context or cognition alone) that comprise situated
cognitions, and helps to more concretely define situated cognitions as momentary or temporally bounded perceptions. We
offer several practical implications of this framework for managers and suggest avenues for further elaboration on our ideas
through research.
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Organizational theorists have suggested that individ-
uals and groups in organizations use identifiable and
stable cognitive templates or schemas for understand-
ing and engaging in cognitive activity (Walsh 1995).
Schemas are defined as relatively persistent knowl-
edge structures for representing elements and the rela-
tionships between them (Schank and Abelson 1977,
DiMaggio 1997). They serve as simplified representa-
tions of knowledge and, as such, as a means for simpli-
fying cognition in conditions of incomplete information
(Berger and Luckman 1967, DiMaggio 1997). Schemas
both constitute and structure knowledge by identifying
those elements of a situation that are salient, and by
describing the causal relations between them. Schemas
contain the knowledge to identify an object or objecti-
fied concept (what it is and what it is not), to make sense
of it (what it does), and to know the relation between its
components (how it works). Theorists argue that a given
schema is applied in the same manner across time and
cognitive context as long as the subject matter remains
similar (making the usual accommodations for learning).
Schemas may be developed for any type of situa-
tion, but come in several common forms (Fiske and
Taylor 1991), including person schemas (templates about
how specific people behave and think), role schemas
(templates about the behaviors of individuals occupying
formal roles), event schemas (templates about how
sequences of common events proceed), and rule schemas
(templates about the relationships between certain types
of actions, events, or concepts). Schemas may range
from the general (role schemas for police officers and
professors) to the very specific (person schemas for
one’s freshman chemistry professor), and from the con-
crete (rule schemas for how to ask a question in class)
to the abstract (event schemas for how a tropical storm
progresses over time from a Level-1 tropical depression
to a Level-5 hurricane).
Given the apparent usefulness of stable schemas (e.g.,
they are easy to recall and maintain), cognitive organi-
zational theorists have proposed that they are used in
a top-down, theory-driven approach to information pro-
cessing, “in all but the most novel situations” (Louis
and Sutton 1991; quoted in Walsh 1995, p. 281). In
support of this notion, researchers have provided sub-
stantial evidence that schemas have strong main effects
on perceptual processes and outcomes in organizations
(e.g., Carson et al. 2003, Boland et al. 2001, Heracleous
and Barrett 2001). For example, Schminke et al. (1997)
showed that the form of an evaluator’s ethical schema
(i.e., his or her view of ethical behavior as that which
follows acceptable rules or processes versus that which
results in ethical outcomes) could be used to predict his
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or her perceptions of organizational justice following a
promotion decision for a hypothetical manager. Evalua-
tors whose ethical schemas were rule based found pro-
motion scenarios designed to be “procedurally just” as
most fair, while evaluators whose ethical schemas were
outcome based found promotion scenarios designed to
be “distributively just” as most fair. In this case, the
researchers argue that understanding the form of one’s
ethical schema is important because it will have similar
effects on justice perceptions across a variety of situa-
tions. As Schminke et al. (1997, p. 1,202) note, such eth-
ical frameworks “color how individuals view the world
and their subsequent reactions to that view.”
While the value of stable schemas has gained accep-
tance among organizational scholars, many researchers
of managerial and organizational cognition have ques-
tioned the primacy of inside-the-head schemas in cog-
nitive understanding and action. Specifically, recent
research has identified organizational, process, and task
contexts that influence the relationship between schema
and behavior in organizations. For example, McNamara
and Bromiley (1997) found that organizational contex-
tual factors such as pressures for subunit profitability,
process standardization, and industry “fads and fashions”
mediated the effects of cognitive bias in the assessment
of risk in evaluating loan applications. Likewise, Sharma
(2000) found that organizational factors such as legiti-
mation of environmental issues and the availability of
discretionary slack for creative problem solving influ-
enced the extent to which environmental issues were
categorized as threats or as opportunities.
Task context has also been found to significantly
mediate the effects of knowledge structures on task out-
comes. Beyer et al. (1997) found that the effects of func-
tionally based selective perception were eliminated when
subjects were instructed to search broadly for problems.
Tenbrunsel et al. (2000) found that framing a decision
concerning environmental policy in terms of meeting
standards (means) versus developing solutions (ends)
influenced the environmental policy that was selected.
Finally, Boland et al. (2001) found that how information
is presented (as concrete and unambiguous versus more
general knowledge) influenced performance on the pro-
fessionalism and work process dimensions of decision
outcomes, self-reports of satisfaction with the decision
task, and levels of ethical sensitivity.
Despite evidence that organizational context influ-
ences the effects of cognition on action, the role that
it plays remains unclear. In some cases the authors
attribute the decline in schema effects to the primacy
of context over schema (e.g., McNamara and Bromily
1997, Sharma 2000, Dollinger et al. 1997). However,
their data and methods only reveal a decline in bias,
which they attribute to a decrease in schema influence;
they do not provide any insight into the relationship
between context and knowledge structure. Other authors
(e.g., Beyer et al. 1997, Tenbrunsel et al. 2000) suggest
that context triggers schema selection. This is the pri-
mary theory behind framing—the way that one presents
a situation influences the cognitive schema that the per-
ceiver applies to it. Framing something as a threat,
for example, triggers a different evaluative schema than
does framing something as an opportunity (Jackson and
Dutton 1988). Thus, the authors argue that task, organi-
zation, and industry contexts may have similar framing
effects, e.g., a greater emphasis on subunit profitabil-
ity may trigger a “profitability” schema or the presence
of discretionary slack may trigger a “high-resource”
schema. Yet, these arguments do not account for vari-
ance across similar contexts, in which the same schemas
appear to be applied to different degrees or differ-
ent schema are applied in similar contexts (Dean and
Sharfman 1993, Walsh et al. 1988). In such instances,
there appears to be more going on than simple schema
selection.
Taken together, much of this research suggests that
a focus on either stable cognitive schemas or influen-
tial contexts may provide an incomplete picture of cog-
nitive processes in organizations. As a result, scholars
have suggested that our frameworks of important cog-
nitive processes, such as decision making and problem
interpretation, may be inaccurate in their predictions of
real-life thought processes (Lant 2002).
A more productive approach, we suggest, may involve
taking seriously the theoretical definitions of situated
cognition (Lave and Wenger 1991, Cook and Brown
1999) and deliberately focusing research on the interac-
tion of schemas and context in situ. That is, look at how
schemas and contexts come together in specific instances
to create “situated cognition,” i.e., understandings or per-
ceptions that are the product of the interaction of a pre-
viously held schema and one’s context at a particular
point in time. We propose that a careful examination
of the interaction itself will more completely illustrate
how cognition in organizations works. Specifically, we
suggest that a better understanding of what situated cog-
nitions actually look like in organizations should help
organizational scholars to better predict how managers
may interpret and understand organizational problems,
as well as their solutions, in context. In the next section
we introduce the notion of situated cognition, review its
roots, and extend the concept to organizational research.
Defining Situated Cognition
Proponents of situated cognition (Lave and Wenger
1991, Cook and Brown 1999, Lant 2002) argue that
cognition exists in the interaction of perceivers’ minds
(schema) and their environment (context). That is, situ-
ated cognition is thinking that is embedded in the context
in which it occurs. Because much organizational con-
text is both social and dynamic—changing as the peo-
ple involved act and interact with each other and their
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physical surroundings—situated cognitions in organiza-
tional settings tend to be transitory, arising as the inter-
actions of existing cognitive structures (i.e., schemas)
and momentary context.
While, conceptually, schemas have arisen to explain
how knowledge persists and shapes cognition across dif-
ferent situations, situated cognition has arisen in edu-
cation research to explain why students have difficulty
in retaining and generalizing knowledge for use across
a range of seemingly appropriate situations (see Lave
1988, Lave and Wenger 1991). In other words, research
in situated cognition that has been undertaken in the
education literature seeks to explain why schemas fail
to transfer across seemingly related situations when they
should (e.g., classroom exercises on mathematics and
the practical application of mathematics in nonclassroom
contexts) and, equally problematic, why schemas trans-
fer when they should not. Learning research suggests
that knowledge is both learned and applied in context
and, as such, it “is situated, being in part a product of
the activity, context, and culture in which it is developed
and used” (Brown et al. 1989, p. 32). Thus situated cog-
nition resides in the duality—the recursive interaction—
between how attributes of a situation evoke and shape
particular schemas and how schemas make particular
attributes of the situation salient.
Situated cognition represents both an ongoing pro-
cess and a momentary or temporally bounded outcome.
As an ongoing process, it describes the activities of
sensemaking—environmental scanning, interpretation,
understanding, and action—that construct a working and
workable perceptual framework (Weick 1996). Yet while
the process of sensemaking has received considerable
attention, the momentary outcomes themselves have not.
These transitory perceptual frameworks enable one “to
comprehend, understand, explain, attribute, extrapolate,
and predict” (Starbuck and Milliken 1998, p. 51) and,
additionally (and crucially), to act within a very spe-
cific situational context. We envision these transitory
or temporally bounded perceptual frameworks as medi-
ating between an individual’s preexisting schemas and
the situation’s concrete particulars. At times, this medi-
ation results in a singularly dominant schema driving
understanding and action—as, for example, in threat-
rigidity responses. However, at other times this media-
tion results in, essentially, a mélange of existing schemas
that like blended spices create a single experience
containing complex flavors. In either case, perceptual
frameworks determine which comprehensions, under-
standings, explanations, attributions, extrapolations, and
predictions are generated and, ultimately, which actions
result. As both individuals and contexts have history, we
might ask how relatively typical contexts in organiza-
tions interact with relatively typical cognitive schemas—
for example, how do individuals’ self-schemas interact
within a context rich in organizationally related artifacts?
What is the resulting perceptual framework; how does
it shape understanding and action in the moment; how
does it revise the original schema?
To move research on cognition in organizations for-
ward, then, we suggest that researchers and theorists
must go beyond merely providing evidence that activity
within and by organizations is influenced by both context
and schemas, and provide insight about specific inter-
actions of schemas and organizational contexts. Such a
focus may help to define what situated cognitions com-
monly look like in organizations, and may help organi-
zations and their managers to build, sustain, and manage
desired situated cognitions (and avoid undesired situated
cognitions).
Situated Cognition in Organizations:
Evidence of Patterns of Interaction
We present here a framework of the common situated
cognitions described in empirical case-study research on
managerial and organizational cognition from the past
15 years. In presenting this framework, our objective is
to focus attention on some of the specific interactions
between cognition and context that comprise situated
cognitions in organizations, as well as more fully under-
stand how situated cognitions (such as problem defini-
tions, self-perceptions, or choice preferences) may be
developed and sustained. This framework is grounded in
a definition of situated cognitions as temporally bounded
interactions of individuals or collectives engaged in
specific cognitive processes, and specific organizational
contexts at particular points in time. Thus, we identify
situated cognitions as transitory perceptual frames that
arise from the interactions of cognition and context and,
in turn, direct individuals’ attention, interpretations, and
actions.
As noted above, our insights about the existence
of common patterns of interaction between cognitive
schemas and organizational contexts is based on a review
of 15 years of empirical case study research on cognition
in organizations. We chose to focus on empirical case
studies because these studies are most likely to provide
rich and detailed description about both the context and
preexisting schemas of organizational actors involved in
situated cognition (Eisenhardt 1989). We chose to exam-
ine research from the past 15 years because this time
period coincides with the rise in empirical research on
situated cognition in organizations (Lant 2002). In all of
these cases, thick description suggested that the schemas
and contexts appeared to come together during the cog-
nitive processes of sensemaking (Weick 1996). Although
we did not perform rigorous statistical analysis of these
findings (i.e., we did not engage in formal meta-analysis
of the case study findings), our careful reading of the
case studies led us to identify evidence of four common
patterns of interaction between cognitive schemas and
organizational contexts that lead to situated cognitions.
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Figure 1 Framework of Common Situated Cognitions in Organizations
Cognitive
Processes
of Sensemaking
Organizational Contexts
Momentary
Situated Cognitions
Existing Schemas
Interaction of Cognition and Context
Event Schemas: understanding about
how a process is likely to unfold
Rule Schemas: understanding about
how key variables are related
Self-Schemas: perceptions of
personal or social identities
Institutional /Cultural Context: the
nature of salient, normative pressures
Physical Context: the set-up of
equipment/furniture, geographic locale
Artifact Context: the nature of relevant
and salient artifacts and dress
Socio-Dynamic Context: the nature of
group interaction including the
characteristics of group members and
the specific processes of interaction
Option Attractiveness: the
desirability of a given choice
Problem Understanding: cause
and effect perceptions, focus of
attention, key variables
Distinctiveness Self-Perceptions:
perceptions of one’s expertise,
skills, traits, abilities
Collectivist Mindset: openness to
thinking as collective vs. individual
Rule Schemas: understanding about
how key variables are related
The framework developed from this evidence and
illustrated in Figure 1 is not intended to represent a com-
prehensive or complete picture of all the ways in which
situated cognitions may arise in organizations, but rather
an illustration of what some commonly studied situated
cognitions appear to look like. Our hope is that this illus-
tration will encourage further study and identification of
situated cognition in organizations, and that a more com-
plete framework will emerge over time. Scholars wish-
ing to empirically pursue the ideas we set forth do face
challenges in attempting to capture these interactions.
Because they are temporally bounded and emerge sub-
consciously as part of the information-processing pro-
cess, they would be difficult to capture with techniques
such as surveys and interviews. However, we do not
see these challenges as insurmountable. The patterns of
interactions we identify in this manuscript emerged from
detailed, field-based case studies that were not, in fact,
aimed at attempting to capture situated cognition. This
suggests that research undertaken to explicitly study situ-
ated cognition could effectively utilize qualitative meth-
ods such as the case study. In addition, experimental
designs that require individuals and/or groups to make
a decision or solve a problem under different situational
contexts could be utilized to better understand the inter-
action between schema and context and the effect that it
has on information processing and its outcomes.
We describe our framework and the evidence in sup-
port of it below.
Perceptions of Option Attractiveness Arise in
Interactions Between Event Schemas and
Institutional/Cultural Contexts
Option attractiveness is the momentary preference for
one or another option that one may choose to take.
Our review suggests that option attractiveness may be
commonly situated in the interaction between existing
event schemas (i.e., scripts about how a process is likely
to unfold) and immediate institutional or cultural con-
texts during sensemaking. Several interesting case stud-
ies illustrate this pattern of interaction (Garud and Rappa
1994, Mitchell et al. 2000, Labianca et al. 2000).
In one example, Garud and Rappa (1994) describe how
two different researchers chose different paths for devel-
opment of Cochlear implants (devices that allow pro-
foundly deaf persons to hear). One researcher, William
House, founder of the House Ear Institute, believed
that the process of developing Cochlear implants should
Elsbach, Barr, and Hargadon: Identifying Situated Cognition in Organizations
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proceed from first developing a simple device, which
would have a fairly shallow electrode implant in the ear
canal, to later developing implants with more complex
and deeply implanted electrodes. As Garud and Rappa
(1994, p. 350) note:
House reasoned that researchers should begin with a
simple device, as it would present the least potential
for neuro-physiological harm to patients while provid-
ing researchers valuable knowledge required for future
improvements.
A second researcher, Graem Clark from the Uni-
versity of Melbourne, Australia, had a different event
schema about the development of Cochlear implants.
Clark believed that researchers should begin their devel-
opment with a complex multichannel device and make
improvements in the quality of sound produced in sub-
sequent generations of this device. This event schema
was supported by a different understanding of the risks
to patients than was House’s schema. For Clark, the dan-
ger to patients was not related to the deepness of the
electrode (Clark argued that there was no scientific evi-
dence to support such a risk). He believed that the risk
to patients would come from using the inferior, sim-
ple device and then undergoing a second operation to
implant a more complex device later.
As their work on the Cochlear implants proceeded,
these two groups came under pressure from local regu-
latory agencies and funding agencies. In House’s case,
pressures came from their development partner, 3M,
to quickly develop a safe device that would establish
itself as a leader in the industry and give them time
to develop a more complex, multichannel device in the
future. House was also under pressure from the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration that was strongly in favor
of a safe device after early prototypes had been linked
with neuro-physiological damage in animals. In the con-
text of these institutional pressures for safe devices over
devices that might be more efficacious (allow speech
recognition instead of just environmental cues), and in
the presence of House’s existing event schema for the
development of simple devices first and complex devices
later, the option of single-channel device became, at least
momentarily, most attractive.
By contrast, the Clark team was working under a dif-
ferent set of institutional pressures. In their case, their
funding development partner Nucleus was pressuring
Clark to develop a device that would allow speech recog-
nition. Clark’s group was also supported by the National
Institutes of Health, which did not support development
of single-channel devices and thus legitimated the mul-
tichannel device. Together, these institutional pressures
temporally coupled with Clark’s event schema about
working on a more complex device from the beginning
led to the momentary, situated cognition of preference
for the multichannel Cochlear implant.
In another example of option attractiveness arising out
of event schemas interacting with institutional/cultural
pressures, Mitchell et al. (2000) describe how event
schemas about how a new business venture proceeds
(what they call “arrangement scripts”) interacted with
cultural norms for individualism versus collectivism, and
low versus high power distance to produce situated cog-
nition about the perceived attractiveness of a new ven-
ture. As they suggested:
Although cultural values are expected to have a direct
effect on cognition within cultures, they might also be
expected to influence the manner in which certain cogni-
tions (by country) relate to the venture creation decision
across cultures ! ! ! ! That is, the effect of specific [scripts]
associated with the venture creation decision are expected
to differ by culture (Mitchell et al. 2000, p. 980).
In line with this reasoning, Mitchell et al. (2000)
found that arrangement scripts (i.e., schemas about how
to use skills, resources, and assets to get a new venture
underway) interacted with cultural pressures for individ-
ualism and power distance to affect the perceived attrac-
tiveness of the new venture. That is, the presence of both
arrangement scripts and cultural values were important
to understanding whether or not a specific new venture
would be undertaken at any specific point in time. In
particular, Mitchell et al. found that in countries with
high (versus low) degrees of individualism and power
distance, the presence of a new venture arrangement
script was more likely to lead to the undertaking of a
new venture. In these cases it appears that information
in arrangement scripts related to personal contacts, per-
sonally appealing projects, and maximization of personal
resources and wealth were viewed as useful and made
the venture creation decision appear more attractive.
Together, these studies illustrate how event schemas
and institutional or cultural norms come together to pro-
duce transitory, situated cognitions about the attractive-
ness of one or more choice options. In general, they
suggest that immediate normative pressures that happen
to fit with understandings about how a process should
unfold are likely to make a normative option appear very
attractive.
Problem Understandings Arise in Interactions
Between Rule Schemas and Physical Contexts
A second common pattern of interaction between
schemas and contexts apparent in the empirical find-
ings is between rule schemas and physical contexts. In
these cases, it appears that individuals’ understandings
about the relationships between key variables or con-
structs relevant to solving a current problem (i.e., a rule
schema) interact with dimensions of the physical context
of problem solving (e.g., spatial arrangements of work-
ers, availability of tools or machines, functional layout
of a work area) to give rise to transitory understandings
of the problem to be solved (Cramton 2001, Tyre and
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von Hippel 1997, Carlile 2002, Sole and Edmondson
2002).
For example, in her study of 45 geographically dis-
persed teams engaged in a student project to develop an
internet business, Cramton (2001) found that the physi-
cal work context (i.e., working remotely through e-mail
versus face to face) interacted with local rule schemas
regarding the evaluation criteria and time scheduling for
the project to create situated cognitions about the under-
standing of problems that arose. In one instance, a con-
flict arose when students at George Mason University
(GMU) did not want to use online chat sessions to dis-
cuss the project because they believed that a phone con-
versation would be more efficient, while their teammates
at Texas Christian University (TCU) were strongly push-
ing to use the chat format for project discussions. At
TCU students were working on the project as a part
of a management information systems course and were
required to use the chat medium as a part of the course.
These students’ rule schemas about the requirements of
the group project included the notion that all of the types
of electronic communications should be experimented
with. By contrast, at GMU students were working on
the project as a part of an organizational behavior course
and were not required to use any particular form of com-
munication medium. These students’ rule schemas about
the requirements of the group project did not include the
notion that particular electronic mediums should be used
for communication.
Unfortunately, as Cramton (2001) describes, in the
geographically dispersed team context, these nuances of
course requirements were not communicated between
the teams and team members assumed that course
requirements were the same across locations because the
project coordinators had indicated that they hoped to
make requirements equivalent. Cramton notes that dis-
persed work contexts that rely on mediated (versus face
to face) communication are prone to such deficiencies of
knowledge about location-specific rule schemas because
those specific rules are not as likely to be discussed or
remembered by team members in other locations. As she
summarizes:
Information about one’s own location and context may be
uniquely held information. According to the principle of
group discussion based on sampling from the information
pool, such information is less likely to be mentioned and
heeded in group discussion than is commonly held infor-
mation [e.g, information understood by all group mem-
bers because it arose from common experience] (Cramton
2001, p. 348).
Further, Cramton (2001, p. 356) notes that, in the con-
text of mediated communication, it becomes “difficult
for teammates to create a mental map of their distant
partners’ situation and to update that map when new
information arises.”
As teams engaged in sensemaking about the “chat
meeting” problem, their rule schemas interacted with
their dispersed work context to create distinct, tempo-
rally bounded situated cognitions about the nature of that
problem. Students on the GMU team perceived the prob-
lem as the result of meeting “preferences” by the TCU
students and suggested in their e-mails to each other that
the TCU students did not understand the difficulties in
scheduling a chat meeting. By contrast, the students on
the TCU team perceived the problem as resulting from
GMU students not caring about the course requirements
and just wanting to follow the easiest possible path.
In another example of rule schemas interacting with
physical context to produce problem understanding, Tyre
and von Hippel (1997) describe how the developers (i.e.,
engineers) and users (i.e., operators) of a new circuit
board assembly machine developed distinct situated cog-
nitions about the nature of problems that arose during
testing of the machine. In one instance, the component
placer machine (which places electronic components in
desired places on the circuit board) was experiencing
“drift” in its component placement and was gradually
wandering out of tolerance. Users who were viewing the
problem in the manufacturing plant tried to explain the
problem to engineers who were working in a remote lab.
Diverging perceptions of the nature of the drift problem
arose as the rule schemas each of these groups possessed
about how “normal” operation of the machine was sup-
posed to look interacted with contextual cues from their
unique physical locations.
In the case of the machine users, the rule schema
about how normal production was to look centered on
“the smooth processing of high-quality parts” (Tyre and
von Hippel 1997, p. 77). So, in the manufacturing facil-
ity, users looked at how the parts were coming out and
noticed misplacement of components. When this infor-
mation was communicated to the engineers working in
the lab, they surmised that the machine must be improp-
erly programmed and asked the users to make sure they
were following instructions. At this moment, the engi-
neers’ understanding of the problem was that it was a
programming problem.
After being assured by the users that they had pro-
grammed the machine correctly, the engineers visited the
manufacturing plant. Once there, one engineer immedi-
ately noticed a loose screw on the camera that guides
placement. Thus, the problem was actually a machine
problem, not a programming problem. This understand-
ing of the problem arose because the engineers’ unique
schema about how normal production was to look inter-
acted with the local context of the manufacturing plant
(an interaction that was different than that of users).
Unlike users, engineers’ rule schemas about normal pro-
duction centered on “very specific expectations about
how the machines ought to look during operations” (Tyre
and von Hippel 1997, p. 77). Thus, when making sense
Elsbach, Barr, and Hargadon: Identifying Situated Cognition in Organizations
428 Organization Science 16(4), pp. 422–433, © 2005 INFORMS
of a problem, engineers used a rule schema that focused
on the machine, not its output. When they were in the
lab, they could not see the machine so their perception
of the problem was based on users’ description of the
problem. However because users’ rule schema for nor-
mal operation centered on output, not the machine, the
users provided no information about the machine oper-
ating abnormally to the engineers. Only when the engi-
neers brought their rule schema to the context in which
they could view the machine was their perception of the
problem accurate.
Together, these examples suggest that accurate prob-
lem understanding evolves from the interaction of
schema and context. In both examples, differences in
both rule schema and physical context across two groups
interfered with effective communication between the
groups and delayed problem solution. In both cases com-
munication and problem understanding were enhanced
by the temporally bounded perceptual frames created
through the interaction of schemas with new contexts
(e.g., when the engineer schema interacted with the fac-
tory context).
Distinctive Self-Perceptions Arise in Interactions
Between Self-Schemas and Artifact Contexts
In a third pattern of interaction between schemas and
context, we found that a person’s self-perceptions of dis-
tinctive traits (e.g., one’s perceptions of his/her expertise
at work) become salient when preexisting self-schemas
(e.g., workplace or professional identities) are brought to
mind in the presence of personally meaningful physical
artifacts (e.g., work-related tools or equipment, personal
mementoes) during the sensemaking process (Weick
1993, 1996; Rafaeli et al. 1997; Elsbach 2004).
For example, in his case study of the 1949 Mann
Gulch fire in which 13 firefighters died, Weick (1993,
1996) describes how many of the firefighters did not
drop their heavy tool packs, shovels, and chainsaws in
their attempts to escape from the fire, even though hav-
ing done so would have most certainly increased their
ability to reach the top of the ridge and escape the fire.
In this situation, Weick (1996) argues that one reason
that the firefighters did not drop their tools was because
of those tools’ role in supporting and signaling a fire-
fighter’s identity. As Weick (1996, p. 308) remarks:
Firefighting tools define the firefighter’s group member-
ship, they are the firefighter’s reason for being deployed
in the first place, they create capability, they are given
the same care that the firefighters themselves get (e.g.,
tools are collected and sharpened after every shift), and
they are meaningful artifacts that define culture ! ! ! ! The
fusion of tools with identities means that under condi-
tions of threat, it makes no more sense to drop one’s tools
than to drop one’s pride.
This discussion suggests that a firefighter’s self-schema
or identity interacted with the presence of his firefighting
tools (a dimension of the physical context) during the
sensemaking process. The outcome of this sensemaking
process was a transitory, situated cognition related to
the firefighter’s distinctive skills. In this case, that meant
perceiving oneself, at that particular point in time and in
that particular context, as a firefighter (who would hang
on to his tools) rather than, say, a hiker (who would drop
them and run).
In a second illustration of this pattern of interaction,
Rafaeli et al. (1997) describe how several types of self-
schema of female administrative employees interacted
with the presence of personal artifacts (in this case,
dress) to make salient distinctive role identities at work.
In their study of dress and self-schemas in a business
school of a large U.S. university, Rafaeli et al. (1997)
found that administrative employees (i.e., staff) held a
number of different self-schemas that defined them at
work and that included definitions of appropriate dress.
As Rafaeli et al. (1997, p. 17) note:
Dress appeared to be a component of the schemata
that organized participants’ ideas about performing vari-
ous functional roles—schemata for organizational mem-
bership, functional area membership, and hierarchical
level membership, and for participation in organizational
events.
In their study Rafaeli et al. (1997) found that when
female administrators were at work in the business
school environment, their self-schemas would interact
with their observations of their own dress to make salient
distinctive role perceptions (and their fit with those dis-
tinctive perceptions). For example, several administra-
tors noted that their membership schema implied that
they should wear professional clothes and that, while
more casual clothes may have been physically comfort-
able, wearing them made administrators psychologically
uncomfortable because it caused them to focus on their
distinctive role perceptions and how they were dressed
inappropriately for these role perceptions. By contrast,
wearing appropriate professional clothes fit with their
schemas of business school membership and helped to
make salient, at that point in time, distinctive role per-
ceptions as forms of transitory situated cognition. As
Rafaeli et al. (1997, p. 27) note:
Individuals saw the wearing of dress that fit their mem-
bership schema as one important signal (to themselves)
that they were not acting out their “work selves” and
temporarily making other selves less salient. In this way,
dress facilitated the process of identity compartmentaliza-
tion (Turner 1987). Organizational dress closed off some
identities while opening up others. By opening up the
role of organizational member or employee, dress made
that social identity salient.
Together, these findings suggest that artifact contexts
that make salient traits that are consistent with a per-
son’s self-schema are likely to highlight and affirm per-
sonal distinctiveness perceptions in the moment, while
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those contexts that make salient traits that are inconsis-
tent with a person’s self-schema are likely to result in
transitory perceptions that their personal distinctiveness
is threatened.
Collectivist Mindsets Arise in Interactions Between
Rule Schemas and Socio-Dynamic Contexts
Work on collective cognition has emerged over the past
decade as both complement and counterpoint to the con-
cept of shared cognition. Shared cognition researchers
(Thompson et al. 1999) study the overlapping knowledge
structures and content of individuals in groups, organi-
zations, and industries, i.e., how individuals in groups
come to represent the world in similar ways. By contrast,
collective cognition (also described as collective mind or
transactive memory) is concerned with supra-individual
cognition, i.e., how individuals in groups come to think
together in a shared process within a specific context.
As such, collective cognition represents a form of sit-
uated cognition (i.e., cognition embedded in the con-
text of group activity). This perspective requires a focus
that is “at once on individuals and the collective, since
only individuals can contribute to a collective mind,
but a collective mind is distinct from an individual
because it inheres in the pattern of interrelated activ-
ities among many people” (Weick and Roberts 1993,
p. 360). In the same vein, Rulke and Rau (2000, p. 373)
describe transactive memory as “! ! !not traceable to any
of the individuals alone, nor can it be found somewhere
‘between’ individuals. Rather, it is a property of the
group” (Wenger 1987, p. 191). Importantly, the notion
of collective cognition does not require the homogene-
ity of shared representations—what Eisenberg (1990,
p. 160) calls the “alignment of cognitions” in organiza-
tions. Rather, it requires just the opposite. In the case
of high-reliability organizations, for instance, collective
cognition preserves the complexity of multiple individ-
ual cognitive structures “and it is this divergence, not the
commonalities, that holds the key to detecting anomalies
[in the environment that require attention]” (Weick et al.
1999, p. 96).
While empirical investigation of collective cognition
in organizations is just beginning, there is evidence to
suggest that it may have important effects. For example,
findings suggest that collective cognition may provide a
means for overcoming undesirable routinization. In this
vein, Weick and Roberts’s (1993) study of the flight deck
of an aircraft carrier examined the collective processes
that enabled this organization to maintain high reliability
despite the necessity of repetitively cycling through rou-
tines. Specifically, Weick and Roberts (1993) identified
the critical role of heedful interrelating, i.e., the mind-
ful engagement of individuals in the social interrelations
of the organization (e.g., determining who is in charge
of navigating the ship versus navigating the airplane)
during the routine process of landing an airplane on an
aircraft carrier. Other studies suggest that collective cog-
nition, in the form of transactive memory, may improve
work group performance by providing group-level mem-
ories of learning experiences. Researchers (Liang et al.
1995, Moreland 1999, Moreland and Myaskovsky 2000)
have conducted a series of experiments in which teams
of individuals were trained either individually or in
groups to assemble radios. Even after controlling for
alternative explanations such as enhanced opportunities
for communication in the collectively trained groups
(Moreland and Myaskovsky 2000), these experiments
showed that transactive memory significantly improved a
work group’s ability to accomplish its task (build radios).
At the same time, there is evidence that the value
of collective cognition for improving organizational per-
formance may depend on individuals assuming a col-
lectivist approach or mindset to problem definition or
problem solving (i.e., a perceptual framework that allows
them to participate in the action of collective cogni-
tion, rather than individual cognition). Interestingly, a
few case studies suggest that such a collectivist mind-
set may arise when individual rule schemas interact with
the socio-dynamic contexts (e.g., Cohen and Bacdayan
1994, Sutton and Hargadon 1996, Okhuysen 2005). For
example, research on improvisation (or “jamming”) has
discussed the role of collective mindsets, as well as sug-
gested how collective mindsets might arise. Eisenberg
suggests that “jamming experiences are highly rule-
governed, structured activities in which little or no per-
sonal information is exchanged, yet important goals may
be accomplished, and a strong, ecstatic bond is formed
among participants” (1990, p. 146). In this way, the
interaction of rule schemas for participation in collec-
tive processes interacts with the social dynamics of
the group to create a temporally bounded perceptual
framework that “provide[s] an opportunity to transcend
the autonomy-interdependence dialectic, simultaneously
allowing for the possibility of both” (p. 146). Eisenberg
posits four necessary conditions for “jamming”: high
levels of skill, a significant degree of structure, a con-
tained setting, and a surrendering to the game. Within
these conditions, one sees the interaction of individu-
ally based schemas and environmental conditions giving
rise to a “surrendering to the game.” Such a collectivist
mindset emerges from the interaction of rule or event
schemas, that describe how particular tasks are done,
where, and by whom, and social situations that require
pooled interdependence.
Cohen and Bacdayan’s (1994) study of collective
memory illustrates the importance of having a collec-
tivist mindset to the emergence of situated cognition at
the supra-individual level. Their laboratory study demon-
strated how organizationally interdependent routines—
in this case the emergent and complementary routines
of two individuals involved in sorting cards—became
stored as collective procedural memories. An example
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of these collective memories can be illustrated by the
case of two people learning a game of solitaire in which
they are not allowed to speak to one another. Over time,
these players can develop individual rule schemas that
they believe lead to effective card playing, and these
rule schemas can be shown to be effective during the
course of the game. If the actual rules of the game
are changed, however (e.g., a novel situation is intro-
duced), these rule schemas can actually impede adapta-
tion of the card-playing process. Cohen and Bacdayan’s
card-playing pairs, with their development of collective
procedural memories, may have failed to maintain a
collective mindset capable of responding to a changing
environment because the conditions of the experiment
in its early stages both cued and allowed for sequential
rather than pooled interdependence. Okhuysen (2005),
on the other hand, described how SWAT team mem-
bers engaged in specific team training and debriefing that
allowed individual rule schemas for working together to
interact with the socio-dynamic context of interacting
in rehearsals for SWAT exercises. This scenario enabled
individuals to acquire a collective mindset and to ulti-
mately act collectively in response to novel and unfore-
seen circumstances that arise in carrying out real life
SWAT raids.
Discussion
Our framework of situated cognition in organizations
focuses attention on both context and schema, rather
than on either of these components alone. This view-
point has a number of implications for extending our
understanding of managerial and organizational cogni-
tion. First, it suggests that situated cognitions in organi-
zations are transitory or temporally bounded outcomes.
This notion contrasts with the predominant view that
cognitions based on existing schemas are relatively
predictable. For instance, in studying rational decision
making in organizations, theorists have spent a great
deal of time developing formal decision protocols that
are designed to ensure a rational and comprehensive
approach to decision making and predictable outcomes
of these decision processes (Russo and Shoemaker 1989,
Dixit and Nalebuff 1991). Protocols such as decision
trees and expected-value analysis were developed with
the assumption that once individual decision makers
had learned a decision rule schema, they could apply
it consistently across situations to ensure the rational-
ity of their decisions (Dean and Sharfman 1996). Yet,
our framework suggests that the decision-making pro-
cess that is applied in any given situation will be the
result of interaction between the actors’ various schemas
concerning decision making and the decision context for
that given situation at that particular point in time. This
perspective implies that in some situational contexts, the
“proper” rule schema may not be utilized or may not
be applied in the manner it was intended. As a result,
the situated cognition that results may be far from that
predicted by formal decision protocols.
In this way, our framework helps to explain why
researchers have found that context appears to alter
the manner in which structured decision protocols are
developed and applied (Langley 1989). For example,
Walsh et al. (1988) examined how political influences
in group decision making affected how a collective
decision schema was constructed (i.e., negotiated) and
employed. In a study involving group decision mak-
ing by graduate students during a two week simulation
game, Walsh et al. (1988) found that groups that per-
formed well in complex decision tasks did not neces-
sarily employ decision schemas that were widely held
in common, or that drew on diverse expertise (as might
be expected based on the well-established notion that
more complex decisions require more, rather than less,
input and decision makers who held a broad understand-
ing of the problem (Kiesler and Sproull 1982)). Rather,
these researchers found evidence that “successful groups
may have recognized that certain individuals’ schemata
were better suited to a problem and allowed them a good
deal of decision making influence, while they silenced
those with more irrelevant schemata” (Walsh et al. 1988,
p. 206). Walsh et al. explain these findings as an out-
come of the political processes that occurred during
decision making (i.e., a contextual influence), rather than
as an outcome of a purely rational use of all available
information inputs.
Our perspective about the transitory nature of situ-
ated cognition also has implications at the group level
of analysis. For example, our framework suggests that
the momentary interaction of group members and the
schemas they bring to bear during that moment are what
matter in decision processes. This viewpoint addresses
the debate implicit in much of the work on team deci-
sion making regarding whether decision-making benefits
that follow from the variety of perspectives afforded by
a diverse decision-making team are offset by the proce-
dural complexities required to bring a diverse team to
some sort of decision consensus (Knight et al. 1999).
Our perspective suggests that nonoverlapping schemas
among group decision makers may be beneficial to deci-
sion processes, and that managers should focus on cre-
ating moments in which disparate and nonoverlapping
schemas come together in a context conducive to the cre-
ation of collective mindsets that are critical to the devel-
opment of effective transitory perceptual frameworks.
Finally, the notion that situated cognition exists
as a transitory perceptual frame has implications for
research at the organizational level of analysis. For
example, research on organizational learning and mem-
ory has focused on how knowledge becomes stored in
institutional norms, rules, and routines (Shulz 1998).
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This focus suggests that organizations learn by devel-
oping stable schemas or knowledge structures at the
collective level by accumulating similar experiences in
similar situations over time. It also centers attention on
the content or outcomes of cognitive processes, not the
cognitive processes themselves. For example, through
sustained interactions with the marketplace, Polaroid
learned that a successful business model focused on high
profit margin software (film) and not the lower margin
hardware (cameras) (Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). By con-
trast our framework suggests that organizational learning
should focus less on retaining the outcomes of cogni-
tive processes (a successful business model) than on
the structure or nature of the process itself (the nature
of the interactions with the marketplace). By learning
what types of interactions of schema and context lead
to the most effective outcomes, the focus of learning
shifts from overly rigid models and routines that are
unresponsive to change (the focus on the film versus
camera business model led to Polaroid’s decision not to
exploit their early lead in digital photograph technology)
toward routines that encourage the development of the
transitory perceptual frames that are relevant to the cur-
rent context. That is, learning must occur in the moment
because the moment is what is essential to defining what
is learned. This perspective helps to explain divergent
findings about breakthroughs in problem solving, which
may occur immediately or after long periods of work
(Hargadon and Fanelli 2002). Our framework suggests
that the right combination of schema and context is what
is necessary to produce a given situated cognition, and
that these combinations may occur early or late in a
project’s life.
A second implication of our framework is that it sug-
gests that cognition important to explaining activity in
or by organizations is created through action, rather
than resulting from the simple application of schema that
reside inside the heads of individuals or groups. This
notion takes us back to some of the original definitions
of situated cognition and early research that suggested
that actions are what theorists should look at if we are
to understand cognition (Weick and Roberts 1993). In
this vein, our framework suggests that research linking
cognition to organizational outcomes should broaden its
focus to include the actions and interactions of people
in context, rather than focusing solely on the schemas or
on the contexts. For example, much of the extant work
on the cognitive aspects of strategic action suggests that
the schemas of managers determine what they focus on
in the environment and shape strategic choice (Barr et al.
1992, Barr 1998). Our framework suggests that a focus
on the interactions of managers with others and with
the competitive environment may be a fruitful avenue to
explore in our search for greater understanding of the
link between managerial cognition and strategic choice.
For example, while Barr’s (1998) work shows a corre-
lation between changes in mental models (schema) and
strategic change in pharmaceutical companies, it does
not explain the origin of those shifts in schema. Perhaps
the new understandings of the environment reflected in
company documents were generated through the activi-
ties firm strategists undertook to better understand their
environment. These activities would include interactions
with others in their organization and with other industry
participants within the context of a shifting regulatory
and competitive environment.
Similarly, at the individual level, research on group
work has shown that intense shared interactions between
group members, such as working out problems or deal-
ing with conflict, constitute the primary content of
shared cognition in organizations. For example, in a
study of 62 software development teams, Levesque et al.
(2001) found that many teams that had higher role def-
inition among members at the beginning of a project
reported less interaction among members a month later,
and consequently revealed less shared mental models
after three months working together. However, Levesque
et al. also found that without the mediating role of
group member interaction, high role definition did not
decrease shared mental models (and was, in fact, pos-
itively related to shared mental models) at the end of
the project. As a result, Levesque et al. concluded that
it was the act of group interaction that was essential
to developing shared mental models, and these mental
models were essentially built around the intense shared
experiences of members.
A third implication of our framework is that there
may be identifiable patterns of interaction that give rise
to situated cognition in organizations. Our observation
of these patterns suggests that there may be specific
combinations of context and schema that would provide
relatively common yet fruitful testing grounds for our
perspective of cognition in organizations as transitory
and contextually situated. Further investigation of these
patterns may reveal new insights that further our ability
to understand and manage cognitive processes in organi-
zations. For example, one pattern we identified suggests
that perceptions of option attractiveness arise through the
interaction of event schemas and institutional or cultural
contexts (e.g., Garud and Rappa 1994, Mitchell et al.
2000). This finding suggests that choice in organizations
is influenced not simply by the schema an individual
manager holds about a specific decision or event, such as
the optimal technological trajectory for the development
of a new product (like the cochlear implant), but also the
perspectives or pressures that exist in the institutional
context in which the work is being done. Thus, managers
who wish to encourage true innovation in their organi-
zations may find that they need to embed the product
development team within a context that differs signif-
icantly from the institutional context that typifies their
current product market (Christensen 1997).
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In the end, our framework suggests that a primary task
of managers and management scholars is to be mind-
ful of the momentary interactions between schemas and
contexts that we may create and/or manage in organi-
zational contexts. By paying attention to what happens
in these momentary interactions, we may better under-
stand and recreate conditions that lead to effective and
desired cognitive processes such as creativity, innova-
tion, decision processes, learning, and strategic thinking.
Our platform going forward, then, is that it is not the
context or the schema, but the interaction that matters.
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